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Atypical work forms – such as independent contracting, on-call, or temporary work – have been 
criticized as providing employment that is more precarious than that offered by regular (open-
ended) employment. One of the concerns attached to these work forms is that they allow 
employers to evade labor market protections afforded to regular workers. In such cases, we might 
be expected to see a greater prevalence of atypical workers in those states with greater labor 
market protections. We test for this possibility using Current Population Survey data from 1995 to 
2005. Our results would suggest that at least one form of atypical work – contracting and 







The use of employment arrangements such as consulting, contracting, on-call and temporary 
work by employers has been criticized as weakening the bond between employer and employee. 
One word that has been cons istently used to describe these workers is disposable.1 Supporting 
this designation are the criticisms that atypical work arrangements (AWAs) offer less secure and 
less stable work than open-ended employment (see, for example, Hylton, 1996; Lee, 1996; 
Nollen, 1996). Equally important in the perception of atypical employment being inferior 
employment to that of open-ended employment is the distinct lack any employment protections, 
explicit or implicit, that are afforded to regular workers and the transient nature of such 
employment. Put simply, these workers lack the key advantage of regular workers in that they 
have no clear expectation of continued employment.  
Against this backdrop, it is less clear as to what forces are actually driving the use of 
these work arrangements by employers. The research into the demand-side of atypical work has 
been primarily limited to one form of atypical work – namely agency temporary work – or 
limited to case studies. Much of the existing research into the use of atypical work by firms has 
been more focused on the de-integration of the labor market (Garen, 1999) and the sectoral 
composition of the atypical workforce (Estavao and Lach, 1999a, b). Moreover, the two studies 
that have examined the possibility that firms are using AWAs to evade labor market regulations 
are mixed in their implications. 
 The present study seeks to examine one aspect of the demand for atypical work by 
employers. It explores the possibility that employer usage of AWAs may vary in the presence of 
differing degrees of labor market regulations. In particular, atypical work might be desirable if 
there is an increased cost attached to a firm’s adjustment of its (regular) workforce, be it 
                                                 
1 For example, see Castro (1993).  
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legislatively or otherwise. In such cases, atypical work might afford a firm with the ability to 
sample workers or to extend offers of (conditional) employment to those who otherwise might 
not initially merit an offer of regular work. It could also be that firms might find atypical work as 
a substitute for their regular workforce if they are seeking to avoid increased restrictions imposed 
upon their hiring/firing decisions. In a perverse sense, increased regulations designed to bolster 
the bond between a firm and worker might actually serve to effectively decrease the job-match.  
We test for this possibility that atypical work is used by firms as a potential response to 
labor market regulations by comparing the usage of atypical work over a ten-year period of time. 
We identify two groups of states which differ significantly in their orientation to unionization 
and collective bargaining. We are primarily interested in determining if there are differences in 
the usage of atypical work between those states that are right-to-work states against those that are 
closed-shop. The primary difference between these two groups of states lies in the ability of 
workers to decline union coverage/membership if representation occurs in their workplace. For 
closed-shop states, workers are obligated to join a union if it represents any of their fellow 
workers. The imposition of union membership may be particularly acute in the case of firms’ 
new hires as they would be required to join the coverage already adopted by co-workers. These 
requirements might encourage employers to substitute atypical workers for regular workers as 
atypicals explicitly exempted from many labor market regulations.2 It may also be the case that 
closed-shop rules encourage firms to simply not hire (regular) workers at the margin, thereby 
increasing the percentage of a state’s workforce accounted for by non-regular workers. 
To further improve upon the body of work in this area, we use a nationally-representative 
dataset that contains richer data on the different AWAs. We are not just restricted to the AWA, 
                                                 
2 Indeed, in the case of agency temporaries, such workers are technically the employees of the temporary help 
agency, not the client firm, thereby transferring the legal responsibilities – and any associated protections – away 
from the client firm. 
 3
agency temporary workers, that has been the primary focus of the existing work. To be more 
precise, we construct three dependent variables which measure the fraction of a state’s workforce 
employed in one of three atypical work forms: contracting/consulting, on-call, and temporary 
work. There are fundamental differences in the type of work that these three AWAs represent. 
Equally important are the noted differences in the types of workers, the implications that they 
have for pay and employment stability, which fill the three different AWAs. Accordingly, we 
estimate a separate model for each of the different AWA measure. 
 We begin with a relatively parsimonious review of the literature regarding labor market 
regulations and atypical work. We next discuss our dataset – the recently discontinued 
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangement Supplement (CAEAS) to the Current 
Population Survey. We then provide our ceteris paribus analysis of the prevalence of atypical 
work in a state’s workforce. A brief summary concludes. 
 
Existing Work 
For atypical employment to exist there must be a demand equal to no less than the supply of 
workers in these arrangements. Although research into the demand side of atypical work has 
been more substantive than that into the supply side,3 it has been hampered by a paucity of 
quality data. In consequence, analysts have either focused on one arrangement, agency 
temporary employment, for which there is available data, or have conducted case studies on firm 
usage of AWAs. To our knowledge there have been only two studies which directly took into 
consideration the possibility that labor market regulations might be behind the use of atypical 
work by employers. 
                                                 
3 For a review of the decision for workers to engage in atypical work, see Polivka (1996). We also note 
parenthetically that this deficit is being rapidly overcome. For a review of the recent literature on the types of 
workers filling AWAs and their implications, see Addison and Surfield (2007) and Addison and Surfield (2008). 
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 Houseman (2001) exploited a private survey of establishments that was administered by 
the Upjohn Institute in 1996. She focuses in particular on the reasons that firms gave for hiring 
workers into atypical employment. The survey was a stratified sample of 550 establishments that 
collected data on the frequency with which they utilized various employment arrangements and 
the primary reasons for their demanding such arrangements. Data were collected on the 
following AWAs: temporary, on-call (per diem), part-time, and short-term work. Establishments 
were asked to select the primary reason for which they used each form of work arrangement 
based on a list initially prepared by the Institute. The author’s analysis failed to uncover much 
evidence that firms were using atypical work as a means to sample workers prior their being 
hired on as a regular worker. Only for agency temps was screening for regular employment given 
as a significant reason for their use. The two most commonly cited reasons, across all of the 
various arrangements, were much more mundane in nature. Namely, firms cited the need to fill a 
vacancy until a permanent replacement could be hired or to fill in for an absent or ill employee. 
There was no indication of the rate at which these establishments hired the workers it initially 
engaged in these arrangements onto their regular payrolls. In sum, firms did not appear to be 
citing either cost savings or increased flexibility in hiring patterns as their primary motivation for 
exploiting atypical work. 
 More important to the present analysis is Autor (2003) who directly examines the 
relationship between a constraint on the firm’s ability to adjust its workforce and atypical work. 
He takes advantage of a natural experiment, court-mandated exceptions made to the 
employment-at-will doctrine, to ascertain if labor market relations and temporary employment 
are correlated. Over the past two decades, state courts have provided for three notable exceptions 
to this long-standing common law doctrine. Autor hypothesized that the adoption of the implied 
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contract exception to the employment-at-will principle served to restrict a firm’s ability to costly 
adjust its workforce and contributed to the growth in the use of temporary staffing services.4   
Employment-at-will allows either party, be it the firm or worker, to terminate the match 
for any reason and without giving cause. As exceptions to this law began to be recognized, the 
firm’s ability to adjust its workforce became constrained. The courts have viewed such implicit 
promises of continued employment, such as the successful completion of a probationary period 
or a record of continued pay increases or promotions, as an implied contract of continued 
employment. Should a worker be considered as having such an implied contract and later be 
terminated by the firm, he or she may be able to file suit against the firm alleging unjust 
dismissal. Put simply, as state courts adopted these attenuations to the at-will principle, the costs 
attached to a firm’s adjusting its workforce directly increased be it from an increased risk of 
litigation or from the increased cost associated with bureaucratic record-keeping.  
While Autor only looks at the effect that these exceptions have on the use of temporary 
staffing services due to data limitations, his findings were very clear. The adoption of implied 
contract exception in a state appears to account for approximately twenty percent of the growth 
in the usage of outputs provided by the temporary staffing industry by other industries. 
Given that the two studies examining, directly or indirectly, employment protections and 
atypical work are essentially a one-off, additional research is warranted. We more closely follow 
the approach of that of Autor by evaluating atypical work at the state level rather than 
Houseman’s focus on the establishment level due to our richer dataset. We improve upon his 
findings by examining a wider range of atypical work forms than just agency temporary 
employment. Our data also includes many of the same controls adopted by Autor to control for 
                                                 
4 The other two exceptions identified by Autor are public policy and good faith and dealing exceptions.  These two 
exceptions, however, are not as common as the implied contract exception and had little explanatory power in 
predicting temporary employment levels. 
 6
state- level workforce differences to allow us to replicate his empirical models. We shall now turn 
to our primary source of data, the CAEAS. 
 
Data 
Beginning in 1995, the Current Population Survey (CPS) added a supplement that was 
specifically designed to collect data on atypical work arrangements. Prior to this supplement, 
identifying atypical workers was problematic and relied on the identification of workers by their 
industrial classification code. To mitigate this problem, the Contingent and Alternative 
Employment Arrangement Supplement (CAEAS) was then conducted biennially in the February 
CPS until it was discontinued in 2005.5 While the CAEAS is primarily designed to collect micro-
level data on the implications that such employment has on its incumbents, we can draw general 
inferences on the size of this workforce at either the state or national level. Using the CAEAS we 
can estimate the size of a state’s workforce that is engaged in a fuller array of atypical work, not 
just agency temporaries. 
 We identify three possible atypical work arrangements in which a worker can be 
employed. The first, contracting/consulting, contains those workers who identify themselves as 
being employed as an independent contractor. In addition, we fold those who are contract 
company workers into this work arrangement.6 Our second measure of atypical work, temporary 
workers, consists of either those workers who are hired directly by a firm in a temporary position 
or who are assigned a client firm on a temporary basis by a temporary help service. As was the 
case of contract company workers, we formed this composite group of temporary workers given 
                                                 
5 Budgetary constraints prevented the collection of data in 2003, providing us with only five usable waves of the 
CAEAS. 
6 This was necessitated by the very small number of workers – typically less than one percent of the workforce – 
who are found in such employment. For estimates on the size of the atypical workforce, see Surfield (2005).  
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the small number of workers employed as an agency temporary. 7 Finally, on-call workers, are 
those who indicate that they work on a per diem basis or who are day laborers. For each state, we 
then estimated the fraction of the workforce employed in one of these three mutually exclusive 
work arrangements by weighting our mean estimates with the supplemental weights contained in 
the CAEAS. These weights were constructed by the CPS specifically to allow for representative 
inferences to be drawn at the aggregate level. The final step in constructing our three dependent 
variables was to take the natural log of the AWA averages. This allows us to estimate the 
percentage increase/decrease in the usage of these work forms associated with the various 
characteristics of the states. 
 The data contained in the parent CPS surveys were then used to construct the labor force 
characteristics, save for union coverage rates8 and the average annual state unemployment rate. 
As shown by Cohany (1996), temporary workers tend to be younger, lesser educated, and a 
minority than are regular workers. At the other end of the spectrum lie contractors/consultants 
who are more likely to be older, better educated, married and overwhelmingly male. To 
disentangle any competing implications that these demographic characteristics may have with 
that of the relaxed legal protections afforded by right-to-work states, we constructed a series of 
state- level workforce variables. To be more precise, for each state we estimated the weighted 
average of a state’s workforce that is: black or an other minority, female, married, married 
females, between 16 and 24 years old, greater than 55 years old, and a set of educational 
attainment variables. We also included the logged value of the state’s level of workforce 
employment given the finding of Segal and Sullivan (1995) that (at least) agency temporary 
                                                 
7 Although seemingly garnering the most attention, and scrutiny, of policy makers, such workers account for only 
one percent of the work force. Their direct-hire temporary brethren, on the other hand, account for between five and 
seven percent of the national workforce.  
8 The union coverage rates were obtained from Hirsch, et al (2001), with the average state unemployment rate was 
provided by the Local Area Unemployment Statistics published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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employment is pro-cyclical in nature. Note that all of workforce demographic characteristics 
constructed followed the convention of those controls used in Autor (2003). 
 Finally, we folded the five cross sections into one pooled sample to facilitate are more 
precise estimation of our regression models. Given the rotational design of the CPS, and that we 
are primarily interested in the state-level data, we do not have any overlap of individuals 
observed across the five different supplements.9 To disentangle any year-specific implications on 




Turning first to the summary statistics presented in Table 1, we can see that in the case of 
contracting/consulting work do we uncover a significant difference in the usage of atypical 
across our two state groups. As we expected earlier, the usage of cont racting/consulting work 
was higher in those states adopting closed-shop rules relative to right-to-work states. States that 
have closed-shop regulations appear to use contracting/consulting work at a rate that is eight 
percent more than that of states which are right-to-work. Critics of closed-shops states also 
appear to be justified in arguing that such labor market regulations serve to increase a state’s 
unemployment rate. Such states experience an unemployment rate that is nearly ten percent 
higher than that of right-to-work states. 
(Insert Table 1 near here) 
 Turning briefly to the labor force characteristics, we see that the two groups of states do 
significantly vary in terms of their work force compositions. These differences may ultimately 
                                                 
9 Households contained in the CPS are interviewed for four months, rotated out for eight, and re-interviewed for four 
more months before being permanently rotated out of the CPS. 
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serve to explain part of the observed difference in the use of contracting/consulting work as 
workers engaging in such work tend to be older, white, married, males and better-educated. Note 
that, with the exception of education which is mixed in its results, we observe a significant 
difference in the expected directions for ethnicity, marital status, and age. Also, not surprisingly 
given the orientation of closed-shops states, we find that requiring all hires of a unionized firm to 
join the union serves to increase the state’s union penetration rate. Closed-shop states have 
nearly twice as many unionized workers, as a fraction of the ir total workforce, than do their 
right-to-work counterparts. 
 Given the competing implications that a state’s workforce composition and its legal 
regulations have on its prevalence of atypical work, we next turn to our ceteris paribus results. 
Table 2 presents the OLS regression estimates of the prevalence of atypical work. We present the 
results for each of our three dependent variables in its own column. Looking at the first row of 
each column after controlling for the observed differences in the states’ workforce 
characteristics, we seemingly produce coefficient estimates attached to being a right-to-work 
state that fail to achieve significance at conventional leve ls.  Unemployment appears to 
significantly explain part of the variation in the usage of two types of atypical work. Each 
percentage point increase in a state’s unemployment rate appears to increase the use of 
contracting/consulting (on-call) work by a state’s employers seven (eight) percent. 
(Insert Table 2 near here) 
 In reviewing the results obtained we use the rate of usage of temporary employment 
within a state as our dependent variable, we obtain poorly-estimated coefficients. Only in the 
case of marital status do we obtain any statistically valid results.  
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Turning next to the case of contracting/consulting (column two), we find that increases in 
the proportion a state’s workforce that is black is negatively correlated with the prevalence of 
this work arrangement. This negative association is also found in the case of increases in the 
proportion of younger workers. These findings are consistent with those of Cohany (1996) in that 
contracting/consulting workers are disproportionately more likely to be those workers who are 
older or who are white. The penetration of unions in a state’s workforce is negatively correlated 
with the usage of contracting/consulting.10 Part of this relationship may be due attributed to 
unions imposing restrictions on the use of this work form in their negotiations with firms. Those 
states which are more unionized may be more likely to be restrictive in the individual employer’s 
ability to use contractors and consultants. 
 Finally, the results in the third column present our estimates when we use the prevalence 
of on-call work as our dependent variable. As was the case in contracting/consulting, we see that 
ethnicity and age do have some explanatory value, although in this case not of the expected 
direction. We see weak evidence that increases in a state’s minority population and younger 
workers serves to decrease the use of on-call work, while having a higher-educated workforce 
also appears to increase the usage of per diem workers. Given that all of the existing work has 
produced a profile of on-call workers that suggests such workers are disproportionately likely to 
be a member of a minority group, poorly-educated and younger, these findings are puzzling. 
With regard to the right-to-work variable, the results presented in Table 2 may not 
necessarily be consistent estimates of the differential usage of atypical work across the two 
groups of states. In the case of dichotomous variables, such as our right-to-work variable, 
differences in the dispersion of the dependent variable (in this case the natural log of the fraction 
                                                 
10 Given the relative animosity of unions towards atypical work, this finding is not entirely surprising. See, for 
example, Lips (1998). 
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of a state’s workforce engaged in the various atypical work arrangements) may correlate with the 
model’s error term – even if there is no difficulty with the continuous variables. If there is an 
error-dependence observed for this variable, then our initial estimates are biased and 
inconsistent. Accordingly, we offer our heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates of the differential, 
using the procedure outlined in Blackburn (2007) in Table 3. 
After we control for error dependence, we see evidence that at least the usage of 
contracting/consulting work is influenced by a state’s orientation towards labor unions. The 
share of the workforce employed in a contracting/consulting work is slightly more than six 
percent lower than that of their closed-shop counterparts. Recall that our simple tabulations 
uncovered an increased rate of usage of this work form that was nearly of the same magnitude. 
Much of the differential still persists after we take into consideration the other observed state-
level characteristics. This would suggest that, for at least the case of contracting/consulting work, 
states with lower labor market regulations are less apt to see employers using such work relative 
to their more active regulatory counterparts.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Given our results, we are hesitant to say, wholesale, that the use of atypical work is positively 
correlated with the level of a state’s labor market regulations. Indeed, this appears to be the case 
with regard to the usage of contracting and consulting work. This finding persists after we 
control for state- level characteristics and after we take into consideration the error-dependence. 
The differential uncovered in our simple tabulations remains fairly intact in our multivariate 
results. 
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However, we fail to uncover much evidence that greater labor market regulations produce 
much in the way of increased usage of temporary or on-call work. This might suggest that states 
are justified in their usage of legislative activity to enhance the bond between a firm and its 
workers, at least in the case of these two work arrangements. Our findings also fail to support the 
concerns attached to atypical work in that employers are using AWAs wholesale to evade the 
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Table 1: Weighted Summary Statistics 
 
 Right-to-work Closed-Shop 
 States States 
 
Temporary employment 5.04 5.00 
fraction (1.55) (1.34) 
 
Contracting/consulting  5.25 5.68** 
employment fraction (1.38) (1.85) 
 
Oncall 1.21 1.26 
employment fraction (0.57) (0.55) 
 
Average annual 4.44 4.88*** 
unemployment rate (1.03) (1.19) 
 
Work Force Characteristics: 
 
 % Black 0.12 0.08** 
  (0.11) (0.11) 
 
 % Other minority 0.03 0.06*** 
  (0.02) (0.11) 
 
 % Female  0.47 0.47 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
 
 % Married 0.68 0.58** 
  (0.02) (0.03) 
 
 % Married females 0.27 0.26** 
  (0.02) (0.03) 
 
 % 16 – 24 years old 0.16 0.15** 
  (0.03) (0.02) 
 
 % Over 55 years old  0.13 0.13 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
 
 % High school graduates 0.33 0.32 
  (0.04) (0.05) 
 
 % Some college 0.22 0.20*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
 
 % Bachelors or higher 0.32 0.37*** 
  (0.04) (0.06) 
 
 Union coverage rate 9.64 17.75*** 
  (3.68) (4.57) 
 
 Log(State Employment) 14.26 14.33 
  (0.92) (1.08) 
 
n  107 148 
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Notes: Results reported as weighted means (using CPS-provided weights) and standard deviations in parentheses. *, **, *** 
denote significant difference in means at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively. 
 17
 
Table 2: OLS Regression Estimates of Atypical Work Fractions 
 
dependent variable: log(Temporary  log(Contracting/Consulting log(Oncall 
 work fraction) work fraction) work fraction) 
 
Right-to-work  0.006 -0.064 0.059 
state (0.045) (0.060) (0.097) 
 
Average annual  0.013 0.066*** 0.077*** 
unemployment rate  (0.015) (0.014) (0.029) 
 
Labor force characteristics: 
 
 % Black -0.166 -0.875*** -0.617*  
  (0.303) (0.294) (0.370) 
 
 % Other minority 0.173 0.160 -0.316 
  (0.187) (0.187) (0.214) 
 
 % Female  -0.396 -2.025 -0.842 
  (1.449) (1.408) (2.254) 
 
 % Married -2.275*  -0.245 0.309 
  (1.171) (1.074) (1.747) 
 
 % Married females 0.888 0.999 -0.728 
  (2.270) (1.865) (3.540) 
 
 % 16 – 24 years old 0.765 -1.793** -2.781*  
  (0.803) (0.749) (1.506) 
 
 % Over 55 years old  -1.564 0.215 0.840 
  (1.171) (0.905) (1.459) 
 
 % High school graduates -1.716 -0.268 0.985 
  (1.107) (1.117) (1.738) 
 
 % Some college -1.643 0.263 3.245** 
  (1.238) (1.103) (1.491) 
 
 % Bachelors or higher -0.824 1.395 0.141 
  (0.967) (0.890) (1.562) 
 
 Union coverage rate -0.007 -0.019*** 0.000 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
 
 Log(State Employment) -0.005 -0.039 -0.095*** 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.036) 
 
Adjusted R2  0.43 0.46 0.23 
 
n = 255 
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Notes: Results are reported as coefficient estimate and Huber-White standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity in 
parenthesis. Four year dummies were included (omitted year was 1995). Omitted categories were whites, % 25 – 55 years old, 
and high school dropouts. *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.  
 
 
Table 3: Corrected OLS Regression Estimates of Atypical Work Fractions 
 
dependent variable: log(Temporary  log(Contracting/Consulting log(Other atypical 
 work fraction) work fraction) work fraction) 
 
Right-to-work  0.010 -0.064*** -0.015 
state (0.005) (0.008) (0.048) 
 
See Notes to Table 2. 
 
